

26 September 2023

06  
Financial assets: annus  
horribilis

18  
Liabilities: long-term  
stability

28  
Distribution: no pro-  
gress

38  
Appendices

Allianz Research

# Allianz Global Wealth Report 2023: The next chapter

# Executive Summary



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## Everything slump

2022 was an annus horribilis for savers. Asset prices fell across the board in the „everything slump“ scenario. The result was a dismal -2.7% decline in private households' global financial assets, the strongest drop since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. But some asset classes suffered more than others: While securities (-7.3%) and insurance/pensions (-4.6%) saw strong setbacks, bank deposits showed robust growth at +6.0%, broadly in line with the long-term trend before the Covid-19 pandemic. Overall, financial assets worth EUR6.6trn were lost, with total financial assets amounting to EUR233trn at the end of 2022.

## The world saves very differently

Over the last two decades, however, securities have been the clear “winner“: their share in the global portfolio increased by almost 6pps to 41% of total financial assets. On the other hand, insurance/pensions lost almost 6pps to 27% while bank deposits held up (+1pp to 30%). However, the differences between the regions are striking. Insurance/pensions, for example, hardly play a role in Eastern Europe but are the dominant asset class in Western Europe (as well as Australia). The same can be said about bank deposits: while they play only a minor role in the Americas, they are the most popular savings vehicle in Eastern Europe and Asia – with the exception of China, where so-called wealth-management products used to be very popular. In contrast, Americans rely mainly on securities, especially stocks and mutual funds.

## Turning their backs on banks

Fresh savings declined by -24% in 2022 – no surprise after two years of pandemic-induced forced savings. However, at EUR3.8trn, they still remain above the 2019 level (EUR3.6trn). As a result, more remarkable than the decline in savings is the change in the composition of funds: Bank deposits fell by a whopping -79%, mainly because American savers withdrew funds. In other regions, bank deposits were not liquidated, but new allocations fell sharply, for example by -26% in Western Europe and by -35% in Japan. In contrast, twice as many securities were purchased globally as in 2021. Once again, US households were the driving force: securities purchases tripled in the US. In Western Europe, despite declining, securities purchases remained at an extremely high level of over EUR200bn. Inflows of fresh funds into insurance/pensions rose by +17% in 2022 and here, too, it was primarily US savers who used the opportunity of increased savings to top up their retirement provisions.

## Riding the market wave

Over the long term, the heavily capital markets-oriented US savings behavior has proven to be very smart. There are two sources of growth in financial assets: savings efforts and price increases (increases in value). Over the past 20 years, increases in value have contributed an average of 62% to annual growth in North America; in Western Europe this figure is 37%, and

in Germany, growth over the long term has been driven exclusively by fresh savings. This significant difference certainly contributes to the fact that long-term financial asset growth is about 50% higher on the other side of the pond. In general, smart savings behavior is the key to higher wealth growth as returns increase with the level of financial literacy. The difference between low and average financial literacy can reach 1.5pp p.a. Over long investment periods, financial illiteracy can cost a fortune, literally.

### **Sometimes it hurts instead**

In 2022, however, being smart did not pay off: at -6.2%, the decline in financial assets was most pronounced in North America, followed by Western Europe (-4.8%). Asia, on the other hand – with the exception of Japan – still recorded relatively strong growth rates. In emerging markets such as Indonesia, Cambodia or the Philippines, growth was even in the double digits. China's financial assets grew robustly, too, clocking growth of +6.9%. But compared to the previous year (+13.3%) and the long-term average of the last 20 years (+15.9%), this was a rather disappointing development – repeated lockdowns clearly took their toll.

### **The undisputed hegemon in finance**

This different pace of growth has led to shifts in the regional composition of global financial assets. In the last year alone, for example, China's share has risen by 1pp to 14.1%; over the last two decades, its share of global financial assets has increased six-fold. On the other hand, Japan and Western Europe has lost out big time (-17.5pps combined). In sharp contrast, North America has been able to maintain its weight at 47%. The American supremacy is also reflected in per capita financial assets, at least when looking at the averages. In fact, only the Swiss (EUR356,310) are still richer than the Americans (EUR307,940). All other countries follow at a fair distance. Adjusted by liabilities, however, the US overtakes Switzerland (EUR253,450 vs EUR238,780).

### **The inflation wedge**

Adjusting the long-term development of financial assets by inflation is a sobering exercise. Worldwide, average per capita financial assets saw an almost four-fold increase over the last two decades. But adjusted for purchasing power, the rate is just +69%. In Western Europe, assets trebled before inflation; after inflation, the increase is a meagre +40% in 20 years, just a tad above Japan (+38%) and only about half the increase in North America (+74%). Only one country bucks the trend: China. After adjustment for inflation, the figures turn out to be lower in the Middle Kingdom, too, but a more than ten-fold increase in the purchasing power of financial assets is an unprecedented achievement; no other country or region can match it.

### **Excess savings? What excess savings?**

Despite bitter losses, global household financial assets were still nearly 19% above pre-Covid-19 levels at the end of last year – in nominal terms. But adjusted for inflation, global household financial assets were only 6.6% above the 2019 level; that means almost two-thirds of (nominal) wealth growth fell victim to price increases. While most regions could at least preserve some real growth, the situation in Western Europe was different: Any nominal gains in financial wealth were wiped out: real wealth decreased by -2.6% over 2019. In absolute terms, this translates into an asset loss of EUR1.1trn compared to 2019: excess savings in Western Europe now exist only on paper.

### **No tailwinds**

After the decline in 2022, global financial assets should return to growth in 2023. This is supported above all by the (so far) positive development on the stock markets, even if setbacks are still to be expected until the end of the year. All in all, we expect global financial assets to increase by around +6%, also taking into account a further „normalization“ of savings behavior. Given a global inflation rate of around 6% in 2023, savers around the world should be spared another year of real losses on their financial assets. But the mid-term outlook is rather mixed. Given that prices will very likely remain above the 2% target for the time being for structural reasons, the monetary stance will at best be neutral: monetary tailwinds will not blow. Strong economic tailwinds also cannot be expected. The recovery of big economies such as the Eurozone and the US might be rather lackluster, and the Chinese economy has ceased to be the global growth engine. Therefore, average growth of financial assets is likely to hover between +4% and +5% over the next three years, under the assumption of “normal” stock market returns. But like the weather, which gets more extreme amid climate change, more market swings are to be expected in the new geopolitical and economic landscape. “Normal” years might rather become the exception.

### **Rising interest rates bite**

The interest rate turnaround was also clearly felt on the liabilities side of the private household balance sheet. After global private debt had risen by +7.8% in 2021, growth weakened significantly last year to +5.7%. The sharpest fall was seen in China: last year’s debt growth of +5.4% was not only well below the growth in 2021 (+13.9%) but the lowest rate on record. Overall, global household liabilities totaled EUR55.8trn at the end of 2022. At the same time, the gap between debt and economic growth widened to 3.9pps in 2022. As a result, the global debt-to-GDP ratio (liabilities as a percentage of GDP) has fallen significantly by more than 2pps to 66.1%. This means that the global debt ratio for private households is back at about the same level as it was at the beginning of the millennium – a remarkable level of stability that hardly fits the widespread narrative of a world drowning in debt.

### **Emerging debt**

However, there have been major shifts in the world debt map. First and foremost, stability characterizes the development in advanced economies such as North America, Japan or Western Europe, where the debt ratio – despite temporary outliers during the GFC – has hardly changed over the long term. In contrast to financial assets, the position of North America has even „deteriorated“ from a share of 44.8% of global debt to 36.5%. Western Europe and Japan are also experiencing equally sharp declines. On the other hand, most emerging markets have seen their debt ratios rise sharply over the last two decades. China is at the top of the list, with a ratio that has more than tripled to a good 61%. Its share of the global debt mountain has literally exploded from 1.5% to 18%. Chinese households now account for more than half of all private liabilities in Asia (including Japan).

### **A bad year for advanced markets**

Declining assets and rising liabilities mean that global net financial assets (financial assets minus liabilities) fell significantly in 2022 by -5.1%, the worst performance since the GFC (-11.8%). Overall, global net financial assets amount to just under EUR177trn at the end of 2022, down EUR9.6trn compared to the previous year. However, advanced regions such as North

America and Western Europe recorded the strongest declines. In other regions, especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, assets continued to grow faster than debt in 2022, resulting in strongly rising net financial assets. Over the long run, however, debt growth exceeded that of assets in emerging markets; in the advanced economies, it was generally the other way round.

### **China and the shrinking wealth gap**

In 2022, wealth growth in advanced economies trailed behind that of emerging markets. In terms of net financial assets, for instance, the latter achieved a growth advantage of 12.5pps, returning to the old pattern of growth after a five-year hiatus during which growth was around 9pps higher. This has had a positive impact on the wealth gap between poorer and richer countries: The net financial assets ratio fell back from over 20 to 18, a value already reached in 2016. Against this background, the number of members of the global middle wealth (MW) class has also risen again compared to last year's report to around just under 780mn. Since 2002, the MW class has increased by +58%, while the global high wealth (HW) class has jumped by as much as +63% (to 650mn). However, closer analysis reveals that these major shifts in the world wealth map reflect China's incredible upswing above all. The rise of households into the global MW and HW classes was much slower in the rest of Asia and even more so in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

### **The growing gulf**

The concentration of financial assets on a global scale remains extremely high. The richest 10% of the world's population – around 560mn people in the countries under consideration with an average net financial assets of around EUR270,000 – together own 85% of total net financial assets in 2022. At least the share has fallen over time; two decades ago, it still stood at 91%. As a result of this high global wealth concentration, there is also a large gap between the global median and the global average of net financial assets. While the median of net financial assets in 2022 was EUR1,920 per capita, the average was more than 16 times higher (EUR31,860). Although this ratio has improved over time, the gulf is only growing in absolute terms. While in 2002 the median and mean were "separated" by roughly EUR10,000, today the figure is twice as high. Another example of the growing wealth gap: Whereas in 2002 belonging to the richest global decile required net financial assets of at least EUR53,000, this threshold has moved significantly higher over the years. In 2022, at least EUR150,000 was necessary for entry into the club of the richest 10%.

### **No progress**

The analysis of the national wealth distribution is disillusioning. There have been improvements only in a few countries and mainly in those with previously (and still today) very unequal distribution, such as South Africa and Türkiye. In contrast, wealth distribution has (further) deteriorated in many large emerging markets, including Brazil, Mexico and Russia, but also India and China. In most cases, this was driven by outrageous wealth growth at the very top. Even more worrying, however, is the development in advanced economies. High inequality has been seen as one of the great social challenges for years – but nothing has been done about it. Cementing a distribution situation that is perceived as unjust is a creeping social poison. And the challenge is not getting any smaller. In the past decade, monetary and fiscal policy could operate almost without restraint. But the next few years promise much more difficult conditions to initiate a turnaround in wealth distribution.




# Financial assets: annus horribilis

2022 was a turning point, both politically and economically. Whether it also marked a turning point for financial assets will certainly only become clear in retrospect. In any case, it was an annus horribilis for savers. After years of the „everything rally“, asset prices fell across the board last year. In the US, for example, stock prices fell by more than -18%, while the corresponding bond indices suffered setbacks of more than -10%. In most other countries, the development looked similar as the turnaround in interest rates was more or less conducted by all countries – albeit at different speeds. As a result, the old rules of diversification no longer applied in 2022; in the „everything slump“ scenario, there was no protection for the portfolio.

This environment left deep scars in the development of private households' global financial assets, which declined by -2.7% in 2022, the strongest decline since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. Overall, financial assets worth EUR6.6trn were lost, with total financial assets amounting to EUR233trn at the end of 2022 (Figure 1). Relative to economic activity (financial assets as a percentage of GDP), the collapse was even more dramatic: This ratio fell to 275%, after 311% in 2021, which was even lower than the value from 2016 (277%); even during the GFC, this decline was „only“ a good 30pps. However, GDP, which was inflated by high inflation, also played a major role here.

**Figure 1: Everything slump**

Gross financial assets, in 2022 EUR trn and annual change in %




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

The reason for the decline in global financial assets is the fall in asset prices. Without these losses in value, there would probably be a plus of about +2%. This becomes clear when the growth rates of the three major asset classes – bank deposits, securities (including investment funds) and insurance/pensions – are examined more closely (Figure 2). Only securities (-7.3%) and insurance/

pensions (-4.6%) suffered strong setbacks because of the fall in stock and bond prices. For securities, this was the first decline in four years, and for insurance/pensions the first decline since the GFC. Bank deposits, on the other hand, showed robust growth at +6.0%, broadly in line with the long-term trend before the Covid-19 pandemic.

**Figure 2: Stable bank deposits**

Development of financial assets by asset class, annual change in %



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.


### The world saves differently

It is also noticeable that the long-term growth rates of the asset classes over the last two decades do not differ greatly from each other: Securities achieved +7.0% annual growth on average, bank deposits +6.4% and insurance/pensions +5.2% over the long term; for total financial assets this rate is +6.2%. The global portfolio shifts are therefore correspondingly moderate, with the development of securities and insurance/pensions almost mirroring each other. While the former increased by almost 6pps to 41% of total financial assets, the latter lost almost 6pps (27%); bank deposits, on the other hand, held up well (+1pp to 30%). The remaining financial assets of less than 3% are allotted to the category „other“.

However, the differences between the regions are striking (Figure 3). Insurance/pensions, for example, hardly play a role in Eastern Europe but are the dominant asset class in Western Europe (as well as in Australia). The same can be said about bank deposits: while they play only a minor role in the Americas, they are the most popular savings vehicle in Eastern Europe and Asia – with the exception of China, where so-called wealth-management products are very popular. Americans, on the other hand, rely mainly on securities, especially stocks and mutual funds.

**Figure 3:** A colorful world of saving preferences

Gross financial assets, by asset class in 2022 EUR, in % of total gross financial assets



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.




Besides asset prices, savings also declined significantly in 2022 – which has already been indicated by the „normalization“ of bank-deposit growth. They fell by -24% last year to EUR3.8trn. However, after the two years of forced savings during the Covid-19 pandemic, this decline is no surprise: With the economy reopening, 2022 was all about (catch-up) consumption. However, it would be an exaggeration to speak of a consumption rush as fresh savings are still above the 2019 pre-pandemic level (EUR3.6trn).

More remarkable than the decline in savings is therefore the change in the composition of funds (Figures 4 and 5). Of the three major asset classes, only one suffered significant setbacks: bank deposits. Here the global decline was -79%, mainly because American savers withdrew funds from banks again. But at EUR13.9trn, the stock of bank deposits is still significantly higher than before the pandemic (2019: EUR10.4trn). In other regions, bank deposits were not liquidated but new allocations fell sharply, for example by -26% in Western Europe and by -35% in Japan. In contrast, twice as many securities were purchased

globally as in 2021. Once again, US households were the driving force: their securities purchases tripled. This reflects a rather anti-cyclical savings behavior: many American savers seem to have seen the setbacks on the stock markets as an entry opportunity. Other savers, however, were much more cautious. In Western Europe, securities purchases fell by a good third, though they remained at an extremely high level by European standards at over EUR200bn – before the pandemic, European savers generally found themselves on the sell side. This development also differs fundamentally from the GFC: In 2008, there was a sell-off of securities worldwide as the panic on the markets was much stronger. With regard to insurance/pensions, as in previous years, the development is less spectacular. In line with the character of a long-term savings vehicle for old-age provision, the swings in fresh savings were smaller than in the other two securities classes. Nevertheless, the inflow of fresh funds rose by +17% in 2022. Here again it is primarily US savers who used the opportunity of increased savings from the pandemic years to top up their retirement provisions.

**Figure 4:** Still elevated


Flow of funds by asset class, in 2022 EUR trn



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

**Figure 5:** Anti-cyclical savings behavior

Flows by asset class in 2022 EUR, as % of total flows



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

Over the long term, this US savings behavior geared towards capital markets proves to be very smart. This becomes clear when we analyze the composition of wealth growth in more detail. There are two sources of growth in financial assets: savings efforts and price increases (increases in value). Over the past 20 years, increases in portfolio value have contributed an average of 62% to annual growth in North America; in Western Europe, this figure is 37%, and in Germany, growth over

the long term is driven exclusively by fresh savings. While US savers let markets do the heavy lifting, European – and in particular German – savers rely more on own savings efforts. This significant difference certainly contributes to the fact that long-term financial-asset growth is about 50% higher on the other side of the pond. In general, savings behavior is the key to higher wealth growth (see Box: Financial literacy pays).

## Financial literacy pays


Does financial literacy actually make a difference when it comes to investment results? In June 2023, we ran a survey testing the financial skills of participants in five countries and also asked them about their assessment of various asset classes in the current investment environment<sup>1</sup>. This allowed us to construct an ideal portfolio depending on the level of financial literacy. What is striking here is that those participants with low financial literacy most often choose cash as an investment. Moreover, with a share of 38%, the group of undecideds – who ultimately leave their money untouched in their current accounts – is also by far the largest among them (average financial literacy: 15%; high financial literacy: 7%). Both together lead to a strong overweighting of cash: compared to the portfolios of participants with average financial literacy, the share of cash is 67% higher; at the same time, equities and investment funds are underweighted by around 30%.

In the next step, we adjusted these three ideal typical portfolios to the prevailing structures in the respective market because our participants do not make decisions in a “free” investment environment but are subject to the conditions and institutions of their country. This implies, for example, a high share of pension funds in Australia due to the popularity of “superannuation” there, or a high share of equities in the US due to the widespread use of 401k plans.

In the final step, we calculate the average real annual return of these portfolios by taking the respective actual performance of the stock and bond markets over the last 20 years. Figure 6 summarizes the results.

**Figure 6:** Playing the game

Average real annual returns on financial assets by level of financial literacy, in %



Sources: Qualtrics, Allianz Research.

<sup>1</sup> See [2023-07-27-Financial-Literacy.pdf \(allianz.com\)](https://www.allianz.com/2023-07-27-Financial-Literacy.pdf)

Three observations stand out. First, returns increase with the level of financial literacy. This is by no means self-evident. For the period observed also includes the years 2008 and 2022, in which equity investors (2008) and bond investors (2022) lost a lot of ground. These were disastrous years for the “pros”, when the default option “cash” proved to be the far better alternative.

Second, the difference in returns between average financial literacy and high financial literacy is small. The portfolios of these two investor types are already largely similar. This is true for all markets in our survey. On the other hand, the difference in annual average returns between low and average financial literacy is considerably higher, ranging from 1.2pp in France to 1.5pp in Spain. Only the US is an exception here, with an annual difference in returns of 0.8pp. One possible explanation is the relatively high share of equities even among the low-financial-literacy investor type due to the institutional framework. Together with the extraordinary development of the US equity markets – an increase by a factor of 6.5 since 2002 – this leads to a certain levelling of returns.

Third, returns in Anglo-Saxon markets are higher. There are two reasons for this: first, the institutional framework that ensures the widespread use of funded pension schemes. As a result, many investors – directly or indirectly – have a high proportion of equities and other high-yielding assets in their portfolios. In addition, there is the strong development of the stock markets themselves – which of course should not be seen in isolation from the institutional framework. Besides the US, Australia also stands out here, with a market that more than quintupled. Only the UK is somewhat out of line with the trend for Anglo-Saxon markets: Although its stock market development is also quite respectable – an increase by a factor of 4 since 2002 – it nevertheless lags slightly behind France (4.1) and Germany (4.8); the reasons are probably to be found in home-made problems (cue Brexit). Bringing up the rear in this analysis are Italy (2.1) and Spain (3.2), which suffered particularly from the euro crisis. It is quite telling that, despite the big difference in market performances, returns in Germany and Spain are overall pretty much the same, testament to the generally rather cautious investment behavior of German households, with their penchant for liquidity, i.e. cash and bank deposits.

How do these differences in returns translate into euros? Table 1 provides an overview based on the amount of financial assets owned by the average household in the respective country (and under the simplified assumption of a uniform average household size of two persons in all countries).

**Table 1:** Taking the gold home

Annual surplus investment income per household over the investor type low financial literacy, in EUR

	Australia	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
Average Financial Literacy	4,690	2,390	2,300	2,150	1,750	3,210	4,740
High Financial Literacy	5,000	2,730	2,690	2,300	1,910	3,690	4,870

Source: Allianz Research.

These figures need no further explanation – they speak for themselves: Over long investment periods – as is common in old-age provision – financial illiteracy costs a fortune, literally.

Note that in the US, the excess return is the highest even though the yield difference is the smallest. This is solely due to the fact that average financial assets in the US are more than twice as large as in the other markets studied.


### The Chinese years

The strong orientation of American savers towards the capital markets did not pay off in 2022, however, but had rather unpleasant consequences: The decline in financial assets was most pronounced in North America at -6.2% (Figure 7). In Asia, on the other hand – with the exception of Japan – relatively strong growth rates were still recorded last year; in poorer countries such as Indonesia, Cambodia or the Philippines, growth was even in double digits. China's financial assets also

grew robustly by +6.9%. However, compared to the previous year (+13.3%) and the long-term average of the last 20 years (+15.9%), this is a rather disappointing development: In the Middle Kingdom, it was not the interest rate turnaround that weighed on market development, but the repeated lockdowns. The strong growth in Eastern Europe is only of limited significance: here the extreme development in Türkiye (+70%), driven solely by inflation, plays a distorting role.

**Figure 7:** Sometimes it hurts instead

Gross financial assets, CAGR\* 2003-2022 and growth 2022 / 2021, in %



\*Compound Annual Growth Rate


Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

The long-term development of financial assets in China is breathtaking at first glance. An annual average growth rate of +15.9% over the last 20 years implies that financial assets have increased almost twenty-fold over this period. Does this stand up to closer scrutiny, i.e. an adjustment for population growth and inflation? Figure 8 gives the answer. It is an unconditional yes. Even if the figures then turn out to be lower, of course – a tenfold increase in the purchasing power of average per capita financial assets in just 20 years is an unprecedented achievement; no other country or region can match it. Incidentally, this also applies to the other emerging Asian

countries, which can also look back on an impressive development; but in India or Indonesia, for example, the corresponding value has „only“ increased five-fold or three-fold. Of course, there is no need to speak of the advanced countries in this context. Western Europe is only a tad better off than Japan; North America, on the other hand, can look back on an increase almost twice as strong as in the Old Continent.

**Figure 8: Big in China**

Gross financial assets per capita, nominal and real increase over 2002, in %



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

### Inflation eats up excess savings


The wedge that inflation drives between the nominal growth of financial assets and the preservation of purchasing power has been huge not only in the long run but of course also in 2022, when the global inflation rate climbed above 8%. Last year, financial assets worldwide lost well over -10% in value. While household financial assets worldwide were still nearly 19% above pre-Covid-19 levels – in nominal terms – at the end of last year, they were only 6.6% above when adjusted for inflation. That means almost two-thirds of (nominal) wealth growth fell victim to price increases (Figure 9). However, thanks to comparatively low increases in consumer prices (on average +2.4% per year), households in Asia suffered significantly lower inflation-induced losses than savers in the rest of the world. With a real plus of +19.7% over 2019, they were in the lead by a clear margin. Eastern Europe and Latin America followed, with a real asset growth of almost +12% and nearly +10%, respectively. But the inflation-related losses were painful: As consumer prices increased by a staggering +11.3% and +9.8% per year on average, more than 70% of the nominal rise was lost in both regions. In North America, as well as in Australia and New Zealand, the average annual inflation rate of 4.6% and 3.5%,

respectively, was well above the target of 2% and cost savers an even greater share of their wealth growth than in the two emerging regions mentioned above. In Australia and New Zealand, inflation ate up 78% of asset growth, while North America lost more than 80%.

However, Western Europe took the lead for the world's highest inflation losses. Average annual inflation amounted to 3.7%, not only reducing but erasing any gains in financial wealth: real wealth decreased by -2.6% over 2019. In absolute terms, this translates into an asset loss of EUR1.1trn compared to 2019, which corresponds to a decline in private savings of EUR2,930 per capita on average. In nominal terms, however, the total increase since then amounted to an impressive EUR3.3trn, or the equivalent of EUR7,310 per capita. In other words, inflation wiped out pandemic-related gains; excess savings in Western Europe now only exist on paper.

Figure 9: Inflation bites

Gross financial assets, nominal vs. real development (indexed, 2019=100) and average CPI (2020-2022, in %)



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.


**The undisputed hegemon (in finance)**

In another respect, the year 2022 resembles the slump after the GFC 2008: the growth gap between developing and advanced economies has widened again (Figure 10). After the growth advantage of the developing countries had shrunk to almost zero in recent years – as a result of the emerging trade conflicts between the US and China – it reached almost 11pps again in 2022. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will be followed by a long period

of strong growth in developing countries, as was the case after the GFC – geopolitical tensions tend to argue for a continuation of de-globalization trends and thus weakened growth. It is therefore likely that 2022 was a one-off in this respect, triggered by the market turbulence of the interest-rate turnaround, which hit the US and Western Europe in particular.

Figure 10: Revival of the old growth gap

Gross financial assets in 2022 EUR, annual change in %




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

This different pace of growth has led to shifts in the regional composition of global financial assets. In the last year alone, for example, China’s share has risen by 1pp to 14.1%. Even more impressive, of course, are the changes over the long term (Figure 11). The breathtaking rise of China in the first two decades of the new millennium becomes clear: its share of global financial assets has increased six-fold in this period. On the other

hand, there are two big „losers“: Japan and Western Europe. At the beginning of the millennium, these two regions still accounted for almost 43% of the world’s wealth but today it is only a quarter. North America’s position should also be seen against this background: The richest region in the world by far has kept its share constant – this once again underlines the exceptional role America plays in the world of finance.

**Figure 11:** Financial hegemon

Gross financial assets, regional split 2002 and 2022, in 2022 EUR, in %



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.


American supremacy is also reflected in per capita financial assets, at least when looking at the averages: in fact, only the Swiss are still richer than the Americans. All other countries follow at a fair distance (Figure 12). This ranking, especially the top ten, has become much more colorful over the years. At the beginning of the millennium, it was still more European. But since then, countries such as Italy (-9 places), Belgium (-6), the UK and the Netherlands (-5 each) or France and Germany (-3 each) have lost considerable ground. But this is not only a story of Europe’s relegation. In the same period,

Scandinavian countries have been able to climb strongly: Sweden gained +11 places, Norway +5 and Denmark +3; only Finland (0) is slightly out of line. In Asia, too, the picture is by no means uniform. In addition to success stories such as China (+9 places to rank 32), Taiwan (+6), Singapore and South Korea (+4 each), there are also „losers“ such as Indonesia, Malaysia or Thailand, which were unable to maintain their positions. Of course, Japan suffered the sharpest drop among all countries, with a fall of -11 places.



**Figure 12:** The Helvetic village

Gross financial assets per capita, in 2022 EUR



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

## Outlook

After the decline in 2022, global financial assets should return to growth in 2023. This is supported above all by the (so far) positive development on the stock markets, even if setbacks are still to be expected until the end of the year. The same applies to the interest rate markets: Although the development is very volatile, depending on markets' expectations for the course of monetary policy, overall interest rates tend to describe a sideways movement; the brutal rise in interest rates in 2022 will not be repeated. All in all, we expect global financial assets to increase by around +6%, also taking into account a further „normalization“ of savings behavior. Given a global inflation rate of around 6% in 2023, savers around the world should be spared another year of real losses on their financial assets.

But in contrast to the GFC, which was followed by “golden years” in asset markets fueled by unlimited liquidity supply from central banks, this time around the mid-term outlook is also not too rosy. Even if central banks are done with the interest-rate turnaround and

rates may even come down in 2024, a return to ultra-expansive monetary policy is not on the cards. In fact, given that prices will very likely remain above the 2% target for the time being for structural reasons, the monetary stance will at best be neutral: monetary tailwinds will not blow. Strong economic tailwinds also cannot be expected. The recovery of big economies such as the Eurozone and the US might be rather lackluster, and the Chinese economy has ceased to be the global growth engine. Last but not least, permanently higher prices will continue to curtail real income growth and savings efforts. Given these conditions, and under the assumption that stock markets will recover (i.e. deliver “normal” returns), average growth of financial assets is likely to hover between +4% and +5% over the next three years. But like the weather, which gets more extreme amid climate change, more market swings are to be expected in the new geopolitical and economic landscape. “Normal” years might rather become the exception.




Photo by Sigmund on Unsplash

# Liabilities: long-term stability

The interest-rate turnaround is also clearly felt on the liabilities side of the private household balance sheet. Global private debt had still risen by +7.8% in 2021. But in 2022, growth weakened significantly to +5.7%, roughly in line with the increase in the second half of the 2010s. Overall, global household liabilities totaled EUR55.8trn at the end of 2022 (Figure 13).

**Figure 13:** Slow down

Global private liabilities, in 2022 EUR trn and annual change in %



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.


At the same time, nominal growth in global economic activity remained at a high level (+9.6%) – „thanks“ to inflation. The gap between debt and economic growth widened to 3.9pps in 2022 – only in 2010, in the immediate aftermath of the GFC, it was even larger. As a result, the debt-to-GDP ratio (liabilities as a percentage of GDP) has fallen significantly by more than 2pps. Compared to 2020, the pandemic-related peak, the decline is even more than 4pps (Figure 14). This means that the global debt ratio for private households is back at about the same level as at the beginning of the millennium – a remarkable level of stability that hardly fits the widespread narrative of a world drowning in debt.

However, there are major differences between the regions. In advanced economies such as North America, Japan or Western Europe, the debt ratio has remained stable (despite temporary outliers during the GFC). In North America and Japan, the debt-to-GDP ratio even fell slightly (-1pp and -4pps, respectively), while the ratio in Western Europe rose by almost 8pps. At 72%, however, it is still below the levels in Japan (74%) and North America (79%). The exceptions among the advanced economies are Australia and New Zealand,

where the debt ratio rose by almost 30pps to a world record of 113%. At least this value is again below the previous highs in 2016 and 2020, when it hit 122%. In the majority of emerging markets, on the other hand, the debt ratio has risen sharply over the last two decades. China is at the top of the list, with its ratio more than tripling to a good 61%; in the other emerging market regions of Latin America and Eastern Europe, it „only“ doubled and also at a relatively moderate level. A word about the rest of Asia, whose stability is perhaps somewhat surprising in this context. This is primarily a statistical phenomenon: Over the years, the weight of the poorer and less indebted countries has increased, which dampens the regional increase; in addition, there was a strong decline in Singapore. At the country level, the picture is different: In many emerging economies of the region such as India, Indonesia or the Philippines, the ratio has developed rapidly from very low starting points, as in China, and has tripled over the last few years. Moreover, in some countries of the region, the debt ratio has reached alarming levels, not only in the richer ones such as South Korea (108%) or Taiwan (92%), but also in Thailand (87%) and Malaysia (81%).

**Figure 14:** Long-term stability

Private liabilities as a percentage of nominal GDP, by region/country




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

However, another way of looking at it shows that the debt problem of private households as a whole is not necessarily worrying: the comparison of liabilities to financial assets. This value – liabilities as a percentage of financial assets – has declined worldwide in recent years, albeit only slightly (4pps, Figure 15). There are only three regions where debt has grown faster than financial assets on average: Latin America, Eastern Europe and China. But even in these regions, the

development does not appear dramatic. The level of debt relative to financial assets is still relatively low, ranging from 24% (Latin America) to 31% (China). In fact, there are only a handful of countries worldwide where the debt mountain accounts for more than 50% of financial assets, including Finland (51%), Slovakia (52%), Thailand (53%) and Norway (70%). In the US, by contrast, this ratio was 18% at the end of 2022.

Figure 15: More wealth than debt

Liabilities as a percentage of gross financial assets, by region/country



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.


### The music stops in China

However, if only the development of debt itself is considered, the dynamics in many countries were breathtaking. Once again, China leads the way. Over the last two decades, private liabilities in the Middle Kingdom have grown by an average of almost +20% year after year (Figure 16). What is equally striking, however, is the rapid crash in 2022: Last year's debt growth (+5.4%) was not only well below the long-term average and the growth in 2021 (13.9%), but in fact the lowest rate ever recorded; so far, debt growth has always been in double digits in all the years for which comparable data are available. If any further proof was needed that China's property market is in precarious shape, it can also be found in this dramatic slowdown in

private debt growth. Besides China, growth in liabilities was also very high in Latin America and Eastern Europe over the long run. However, inflation played a bigger role in both regions. Among the advanced economies, Japan and North America stand out as in both regions debt growth in 2022 was above the long-term average. In North America, this was mainly the result of the lean years after the GFC in which debt growth not only slowed down but turned negative: debt was reduced on balance. In Japan, on the other hand, the relatively strong increase in private debt – by Japanese standards – could perhaps signal that the country is actually succeeding in freeing itself from the years-long grip of deflation.

**Figure 16: The music stops in China**

Increase of private debt by region/country, in %




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

In view of these figures, it is hardly surprising that there have been significant shifts on the world debt map over the last two decades. In contrast to financial assets, the position of North America has also „deteriorated“ (Figure 17). Whereas 20 years ago almost half of all private liabilities were on North America’s books, the figure was „only“ just under 37% by the end of 2022. Western Europe and Japan are experiencing

equally sharp declines. In fact, at the beginning of the millennium, these three regions accounted for 92% of all global debt; today it is 65%. The opposite development can be seen in Asia and especially in China: its share of the global debt mountain has literally exploded from 1.5% to 18%. Chinese households now account for more than half of all private liabilities in Asia (including Japan).

**Figure 17: De-Westernization**

Private liabilities, regional split 2002 and 2022, in 2022 EUR and in %




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

Despite the rapid growth dynamics and shifts on the debt world map, the debt burden that households in emerging markets have to shoulder is, of course, only a fraction of that incurred by households in advanced economies: the latter exceeds the former by a factor of 12 (Figure 18). The three countries with the highest debt

per capita worldwide are Switzerland (EUR117,500), Norway (EUR80,300) and Australia (EUR70,900). In the group of emerging markets, China is already in third place; only in Chile (EUR7,300) and Malaysia (EUR9,200) was debt per capita higher at the end of 2022.

**Figure 18:** Under the yoke

Private liabilities per capita 2022, in EUR



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

### A bad year


Declining assets and rising liabilities mean that net financial assets (financial assets minus liabilities) fell significantly in 2022 by -5.1%, the worst growth rate since the GFC in 2008 (-11.8%). Overall, global net financial assets amounted to just under EUR177trn at the end of 2022; this means a decline of EUR9.6trn compared to the previous year.

The development in the individual regions varied greatly. The strongest declines were recorded in the advanced regions such as North America and Western

Europe – and in Latin America. Here, a moderate decline in assets (especially in Brazil) met with unabatedly high demand for credit; as a result, the decline in 2022 even exceeded that of 2008 (Figure 19). In other regions, however, especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, assets continued to grow faster than debt in 2022, resulting in rising net financial assets. In China, for example, net financial assets climbed to EUR22.8trn – about three quarters of the Western European value; at the beginning of the millennium, it was just one tenth.

**Figure 19:** A bad year – but not for all

Net financial assets, CAGR 2003-2022 and growth 2022 / 2021, in %




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

Again, it is worth adjusting these data for population growth and especially inflation (Figure 20). At first glance, the picture is very similar to that of gross financial assets. China is the undisputed leader, with net per capita financial assets, adjusted for purchasing power, increasing more than seven-fold in the last two decades. No other region can keep up, not even the

other emerging market regions, where a doubling can rather be observed. Among the advanced economies, it is noticeable that Western Europe and Japan have swapped places: Western Europe now carries the red lantern. Those who speak of lost decades in Japan should not remain silent about Western Europe.

**Figure 20:** China remains on top – by a wide margin

Net financial assets per capita, nominal and real increase over 2002, in %




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

Even more interesting is the direct comparison of the development of gross and net financial assets. A clear pattern can be seen here: In emerging markets, the latter lags behind the former, i.e. debt growth exceeds that of assets. In the advanced economies, it is generally the other way round. For the world as a whole, this results in a plus of around +10% in net asset growth over that of gross assets (Figure 21). Asia (ex China and Japan) seems to be out of line but this is entirely due to the richer countries in the region such as South Korea, Taiwan and especially Singapore. What is true for China is also true for the region's emerging markets: liabilities reduce asset growth significantly, by about a quarter to a third. On the other hand, Japan stands out, with debt-adjusted growth 42% higher; the gap is also quite

high in North America (+26%), almost twice as much as in Western Europe. However, this is mainly due to the great heterogeneity of the Old Continent in dealing with private liabilities: On the one hand, there are countries like Spain, Portugal and Ireland, which had to reduce liabilities massively after the euro crisis and which therefore show significantly higher asset growth after debt than before debt (+69%, +47% and 59%, respectively). Germany (+90%) and the Netherlands (+51%) also belong to this group. On the other hand, countries such as Italy (-68%), Belgium (-65%), Finland (-43%) and France (-11%) have seen their debt grow faster than their wealth over the past 20 years.

**Figure 21:** The one chart that Japan tops: private austerity

Difference of per capita net and gross financial assets' real increase over 2002, in %



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.




Where is the development of net financial assets heading? In Figure 22, we provide the ranking of the richest 25 countries by per capita net financial assets at the end of 2022. It shows that Switzerland has lost its first position to the US. However, with per capita debt in Switzerland at EUR117,500, more than twice as high as in the US (EUR54,500), the change of position is not really

surprising. There are also some changes in the other position, but nothing very serious. New Zealand and Italy, for example, fared four places better; Japan and Spain (+3 each) also improved. In contrast, Norway (-9) and Australia (-5) fell back significantly.

**Figure 22:** Leadership change

Net financial assets per capita, in 2022 EUR



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.


## Real estate in selected countries

What would the net financial assets per capita ranking look like if real estate values were also taken into account? Due to insufficient data, we have previously refrained from systematically including real estate in our report. But over the years, the statistical recording of house and land values has also made progress. Reliable and comparable data series on the real estate assets of private households are now available for a number of countries, especially advanced economies. In the following analysis, we refer to the following regions and countries: North America, Japan, Australia and Western and Eastern Europe<sup>2</sup>.

Overall, the real estate assets (value of land and dwellings) of private households in this group of countries amounted to around EUR140trn at the end of 2022. This was 19% less than gross financial assets (EUR177trn.). This is quite surprising, since real estate assets – usually the owner-occupied house – are generally regarded as the largest asset item on the household balance sheet. This is also true for Australia, Eastern and Western Europe: On average, property values were 49%, 23% and 27% higher than financial assets, respectively. In Germany and France, for example, they were even more than 50% higher. But this was not the case in Japan (-37%) and in North America – which accounts for almost half of all real estate values included here. In the US alone, the value of real estate holdings was 39% lower than that of financial assets. On the other hand, property owners were still able to enjoy strong increases in value in 2022. Overall, the increase was +8.8%. The collapse in demand for real estate caused by the turnaround in interest rates and inflation will only be reflected in a decline in house prices across the board this year. Last year, it was only Australian households that already suffered the first setbacks (Figure 23). In contrast to financial assets, the long-term development is much more synchronous, with average growth rates of between +4% and +8% over the past ten years. Only Japan, with an annual growth rate of less than +2%, stands out somewhat. The development was even worse only in Italy, where prices fell by -0.5% per year on average. On the other hand, there is only one country among those surveyed that can boast a double-digit growth rate over the long term: Hungary with +11.9%.

**Figure 23:** Before the storm

Real estate, CAGR 2013-2022 and growth 2022 / 2021, in %




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, OECD, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.

<sup>2</sup> In Western Europe, data are missing for Greece, Portugal, Malta and Ireland. The region Eastern Europe does not include Kazakhstan, Latvia, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Türkiye.

In the ranking of countries with the highest real estate assets, Switzerland (EUR295,500) is ahead of Australia (EUR241,100) and the US (EUR186,600). Then come the other Western Europeans, led by Norway (which is of course also due to the data-related limitation of the group of countries examined). What would the ranking look like if net financial assets and real estate assets were shown together? Figure 24 shows that the shifts would not be very serious. Switzerland would again be at the top and Australia in particular would do much better. France, Austria and Norway would also benefit from the inclusion of real estate assets. Sweden and Japan would be among the „losers“. For all the other „climbers“, it is important to keep in mind that for three of the ten richest countries by net financial assets (Singapore, Taiwan and New Zealand), no data on real estate assets is available; this leads to automatic „upgrades“.

**Figure 24:** Not much change

Net financial and real estate assets per capita, in 2022 EUR



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, OECD, Refinitiv Eikon, Allianz Research.



# Distribution: no progress




Photo by Roman Wimmers Unsplash

The international perspective: convergence reloaded? The long-term consequences of geopolitical changes are likely to dampen the growth of emerging economies. Their successes in recent decades owed much to an increasing international division of labor amid far-reaching trade liberalization, aka hyper-globalization. The wind has changed, and not just since the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine. The three Ds of the global economy – deglobalization, digitalization and decarbonization – require a new business model. The times when countries came to growth and prosperity as the extended workbench of the advanced economies are over. The decisive – but often underestimated – players here are the consumers: Cheap mass goods are increasingly being displaced by sustainably produced goods. This transformation process will take several years and also offers opportunities for emerging economies, not least in the green transformation. But the immediate effects of production shifts, more (green) regulation and increasing political uncertainty are negative for now. It is therefore certainly no coincidence that there is currently renewed talk of the „Global South“ – it is an expression of the growing unease that the win-win situation of the globalization years threatens to tip over into emerging zero-sum struggles between poorer and richer countries.

But this transformation of the world economy will by no means be a linear process. In 2022, for example, advanced economies were more affected than the emerging countries, at least in terms of wealth development, partly because of the simultaneous turnaround in interest rates. As a result, after the growth of net financial assets between 2017 – the year in which the trade disputes between the US and China broke out openly – and 2021 was overall around 9pps higher in advanced economies than in emerging markets, the picture turned again in 2022 in favor of the latter. In total, emerging markets were able to achieve a growth advantage of 12.5pps. This has had a positive impact on the wealth gap between poorer and richer countries: The net financial assets ratio fell back from over 20 to 18, a value that had already been reached in 2016. However, it remains to be seen whether this will resume the long-term convergence process that stalled in 2017 – 20 years ago, average net financial assets per capita in advanced economies were 64 times greater than that of emerging markets (Figure 25).

**Figure 25: Convergence reloaded?**

Net financial assets per capita, ratio between advanced and emerging markets



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, WID, Allianz Research.

Against this background, the number of members of the global middle wealth (MW) class has also risen again compared to last year's report to around just under 780mn.<sup>3</sup> However, not too much attention should be paid to changes at the current margin as exchange rate developments can also play a role here, for example. More revealing is the long-term development: Since 2002, the MW class has increased by 58% in terms of numbers; the global high wealth (HW) class by as much as +63% (to 650mn). In contrast, the global low wealth (LW) class has increased by only +9% (to 4,150mn), with a general population growth of +19% in the group of countries examined here. The weights have shifted accordingly. The LW class now accounts for „only“ 74% of the total population (after 81% in 2002), while the HW class accounts for 12% (8.5%) and MW class for 14% (10.5%). These figures underline the progress of the last decades: the world has become a little more „equal“.

### The greatest wealth story on earth


Looking at the composition of the individual wealth classes, it becomes clear who was behind this development. At first glance, there seem to be hardly any shifts in the LW class (Figure 26). China's share has fallen slightly, while that of the rest of Asia (excluding Japan)

has risen somewhat. The latter, however, is solely due to the strong population growth in this region; if one looks at the shares within the region, it becomes clear that the share of the LW class in the rest of Asia has fallen from over 96% to the current 90%; in China the decline was even 20pps, from 90% to 70%. In this respect, there are already indications here: China's development is also unique in the Asian context. In addition, there were almost no changes for Latin America and Eastern Europe – although here, too, the share of the LW class within the region declined slightly, by 3pps and 6pps, respectively. What is really interesting, however, are the (small) shifts in Western Europe and North America. Although their share has only risen by a few tenths of a percentage point, this masks dramatic developments, especially in Western Europe: The number of members of the LW class has risen from 105mn to 149mn; with it, the population share has also jumped from 27% to 35%. The development in North America is not quite as dramatic: an increase of 16mn to 109mn, but with a stable population share (29%). The Old Continent has become „poorer“ on a global scale.

<sup>3</sup>The classification in wealth classes is based on worldwide average net financial assets per capita, which stood at EUR31,860 in 2022. The global middle wealth class („middle wealth“, MW) includes all individuals with assets of between 30% and 180% of the global average. This means that for 2022, asset thresholds for the global middle wealth class are EUR9,600 and EUR57,400. The „low wealth“ (LW) category, on the other hand, includes those individuals with net financial assets that are below a EUR9,600 threshold, while the term „high wealth“ (HW) applies to those with net financial assets of more than EUR57,400 (for details on how the asset thresholds are set, see Appendix A).

**Figure 26: The sun sets in the West**

Global low wealth class, members by region in %




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, World Inequality Database, Allianz Research.

The changes in the global MW class are immediately apparent (Figure 27). Every third member of this class now comes from China, and every fourth from the rest of Asia (excluding Japan). At the beginning of the millennium, the two regions together accounted for only one-third of this wealth class. Nothing illustrates the rise of Asia, and China in particular, more clearly than these figures. Mirroring this, the shares of the other regions

have declined sharply, primarily due to the rapid growth of this wealth class – but not only that. In North and South America, there was also an absolute decline, albeit in favor of the global HW class in each case; in the other regions, however, the figures remained largely stable.

**Figure 27: The sun rises in the East**

Global middle wealth class, members by region in %



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, World Inequality Database, Allianz Research.


The development of the HW class is less clear-cut than it might appear at first glance. However, this does not apply to China, which has made a huge step forward: Many Chinese have made it into this class, and more than a fifth of its members are now recruited from China; 20 years ago, China played virtually no role in this wealth class. But already with North America, things are not so clear-cut. The region’s share has declined (though North America still accounts for the largest contingent), but this is solely because in other regions of the world, such as China, the numbers have risen even faster. In fact, more North Americans belong to this wealth class today (just under 220mn) than 20 years ago (just under 160mn); their population share has also risen by 9pps to 58%. So while the LW class has remained stable and the MW class has shrunk, the HW class has grown – a sign of the increasing polarization in North America. A similar development can be observed in Latin America: The HW class is growing in number and share at the expense of the MW class. However, at least in the south of the double continent, the LW class has also shrunk (slightly) in share. Western Europe stands in contrast. Here, the members of the HW class have declined both in numbers (from 149mn to 132mn) and in population share (from 38% to 31%).

As a result, the Old Continent now accounts for fewer members of the global HW class than China. The other big „loser“ is Japan, where the number of members of the HW class is also shrinking. As in Western Europe, the LW class has grown, while the MW class has remained largely stable: those who have dropped out of the HW class are making up for the bloodletting in the MW class. A word about Eastern Europe: Here, the development is similar to the one that took place in Latin America, albeit in a weakened form. Above all, the number of members of the HW class increased, but at least not at the expense of the MW class. But especially in comparison to Asia, a striking difference can be observed: While wealth growth there also radiates to the middle, it seems to be concentrated more at the top of the distribution pyramid in the two other emerging regions.

The bottom line: The major shifts on the world wealth map reflect China’s incredible upswing above all. In the rest of Asia and even more so in Latin America and Eastern Europe, the development – the rise of numerous households into the MW class and HW class – was much slower.

Figure 28: Cloudy

Global high wealth class, members by region in %



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, World Inequality Database, Allianz Research.

## The growing divide

The concentration of financial assets on a global scale remains extremely high. This becomes clear when the total population of the countries we analyze is broken down by population decile on the basis of net financial assets.


This shows that the richest 10% of the world's population – around 560mn people in the countries under consideration with an average net financial assets of around EUR270,000 – together own 85% of total net financial assets in 2022. At least the share has fallen over time; two decades ago, it still stood at 91%. At the other end of the spectrum, among the bottom half of the population, some 2.8bn people, less than 1% remains. The latter figure should be interpreted with caution, however, as the people with the lowest wealth include many indebted people from the richest countries; the „poorest“ decile of the world's population has negative net financial assets, but high debt does not necessarily equate to poverty. The Scandinavian countries are a good example of this. Households in Denmark and Sweden are among the most indebted in the world but this high debt is generally offset by tangible assets, especially real estate. A happy homeowner in Denmark should not be confused with a penniless day laborer in India.

As a result of this high global wealth concentration, there is also a large gap between the global median and the global average of net financial assets. While the median of net financial assets in 2022 was EUR1,920 per capita, the average was more than 16 times higher (EUR31,860). This ratio, too, has improved over time (Figure 29). However, in absolute terms, the gulf is only growing. While in 2002 median and mean were “separated” by roughly EUR10,000, today, the figure is twice as high. Another example of the growing wealth gap: Whereas in 2002 belonging to the richest global decile required net financial assets of at least EUR53,000, this threshold has moved significantly up over the years: in 2022, at least EUR150,000 were necessary for entry to the club of the richest 10%.

These huge absolute differences are the main reasons for the different growth rates per decile (Figure 30). Average net wealth per capita shows the lowest growth rates in the two richest deciles, while it grew much faster in the lowest deciles – where net financial assets amount to only a trickle to what is owned by the richer deciles. Therefore, even with high growth differentials, a more equal distribution of wealth at the global level remains a distant dream. A word about the first decile with the lowest net financial assets. Its negative growth rate has a simple reason: On average, people in this decile are over-indebted so the decline in their „net financial assets“ means nothing other than rising debt.

**Figure 29:** An improvement, sort of

Net financial assets per capita, ratio between mean and median global values




Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, WID, Allianz Research.



**Figure 30: High growth to nowhere**

Growth of average net financial assets per capita per decile, 2022/2002 in %



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, WID, Allianz Research.

### The national perspective: No progress

The last two decades saw a world rife with crises, from the GFC and the euro crisis to Covid-19 and the ongoing cost-of-living crisis. What were the effects of these events – and the ensuing policy counter-measures – on national wealth distribution?

There are several concepts for measuring national inequality; the best-known measure is certainly the Gini coefficient (see appendix). In the following, three other indicators will be examined in more detail that are more closely related to the situation of the middle class:


1. The ratio of the mean to the median (mean/median) – a large difference between these two values indicates a strong „distortion“ of the distribution in the higher wealth segments.
2. The ratio of 90th percentile to median (p90/p50) – a large difference between these two values indicates the long way ahead for households in the middle to move up into the group of the wealthiest 10%.
3. The share of net financial assets of the top 10% – the higher this share, the greater the gap between the wealthiest 10% and the rest of society.

### Mean/median comparison

In 2022, the ratio of the mean to the median ranged from 1.8 (Slovakia) to 11.4 (South Africa). For the majority of the countries examined here, however, the values ranged between 2 and 3.5, i.e. the mean value of net financial assets was two to three times higher than the median value. This is also true, for example, of France (2.6) Italy (2.8) and Germany (2.9). Apart from South Africa, there are only a handful of countries where this ratio indicates (extremely) high inequality, e.g. the US (3.9), Russia (4.3), Mexico (6.3) or Brazil (6.6). In addition to the absolute level of this indicator, the changes over the last few years are of interest (Figure 31). What is striking at first glance is that for the vast majority of countries this indicator has hardly moved in the last 20 years; this is also indicated by the unweighted average: it rose only minimally from 3.1 (2002) to 3.2 (2022).

**Figure 31:** Not much change I

Ratio between mean and median net financial assets, change in points



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, World Inequality Database, Allianz Research.

Nevertheless, some interesting observations can be made at the country level. Ultimately, there are only five countries in which the ratio has improved significantly (change greater than 1). In all five, however, the value at the end of 2022 was still significantly above average, especially in South Africa (11.4), Peru (5.6) and Türkiye (3.6). In other words, improvements have been made from the starting point of a very strong inequality of distribution; these countries are still far from an „equitable“ distribution. In South Africa, moreover, the improvement was concentrated solely in the second decade, when South Africa slid into a deep economic crisis; for Türkiye, the exact opposite is true.

Something similar can be said about the countries at the opposite end of the range. Again, there are only very few countries (four) with a significant deterioration. However, here too the starting point was an already significantly skewed distribution; this is especially true for Brazil, Mexico and Russia. The exception is China, where at the beginning of the millennium the ratio of mean to median was still 1.9; in the meantime it has risen to 3.3, slightly above the average. The rapid wealth accumulation in China was accompanied by an increasing uneven wealth distribution. This also applies to a lesser extent to India, where the value has deteriorated by 0.8 points. A word about the US: Over the entire period, the development was unspectacular – but two completely different phases can be distinguished. In the first decade,


the 2000s, wealth inequality increased sharply; in the second decade, the 2010s, it decreased again. The latter is probably mainly due to the recovery of the real estate markets and a robust labor market. A similar dichotomy can also be observed in other countries such as Ireland, Chile and Mexico.

#### P90/p50 comparison

This ratio is naturally much higher than the mean/median ratio, ranging from 5.8 (Slovakia) to 53.8 (South Africa). For most countries, the value in 2022 was between 7 and 13; i.e. a household in the middle of the distribution would have to increase its net financial assets roughly tenfold to reach the threshold of the richest 10%. This is similar to the situation in France (9.8), Italy (10.4) and Germany (11.0). By and large, it is the same countries – apart from South Africa – that show a high level of inequality according to this indicator (including Brazil, Mexico, Russia, the US). The development over time also confirms the picture provided by the mean-median comparison: hardly any change for the vast majority of the countries examined; the unweighted mean, for example, has only increased slightly from 12.2 (2002) to 12.6 (2022) (Figure 32). The picture is also almost identical at the country level. In China, for example, the factor has climbed by 7 points to 13.0, i.e. from a clearly below-average to a slightly above-average value.

**Figure 32: Not much change II**

Ratio between p90 and p50 (median) values, change in points



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, World Inequality Database, Allianz Research.


**Share Top10**

Finally, let’s take a look at the share of the wealthiest 10% in total net financial assets. Here the range is from 47.9% (Netherlands) to 84.6% (South Africa). Essentially, the values mirror the previous analysis; for example, Slovakia has the second lowest value (49.7%), while Mexico (78.8%) and Brazil (79.9%) again have very high values. The unweighted average is 62%; slightly below this level

are the large European countries Italy (56.2%), France (59.5%) and Germany (59.6%). In contrast to the two previous ratios, however, the share of the top 10 has developed quite dynamically in recent decades – in both directions (Figure 33). This is less evident in the overall aggregate – the unweighted average has risen by less than 2pps – than primarily at the country level.

Figure 33: Movement at the top

Share of top 10 in total net financial assets, change in pp



Sources: Eurostat, national central banks, financial supervisory authorities, financial associations and statistical offices, IMF, Refinitiv Eikon, World Inequality Database, Allianz Research.

The first thing that stands out is that South Africa is no longer at the „top“. Over the entire period, the share of the top 10 has risen minimally by just under 1pp – again with two very different halves: significantly more inequality in the 2000s, then the trend reversed in the 2010s. Türkiye is now at the top – i.e. it is the country where the share of the top 10 has fallen the most; at 68.0%, however, its share is still above average. What is interesting is comparing with South Africa: While in Türkiye it was rather the boom years (first decade of the millennium) that improved the distribution situation, in South Africa it is exactly the opposite. In distribution issues, every country is unhappy in its own way; there seem to be no generally valid patterns and thus no patent remedies that are effective everywhere.

This becomes „equally clear when looking at the other end of the development: the countries where the share of the top 10 has increased the most. Here China and Greece are at the top, for very different reasons. In China (+18.9pps to 68.0%) it was mainly the „wild“ 2000s of unbridled growth, when the private sector was still hardly subject to restrictions, that caused inequality

to rise. In the last ten years, on the other hand, there have hardly been any more shifts (as with the other two key metrics). Overall, however, the deterioration with regard to the top 10 is much greater than for the two metrics that focus more on the situation in the middle of the distribution. The growing inequality in the Middle Kingdom seems to be mainly a consequence of fast rising wealth at the very top of the distribution pyramid. In Greece (+11.4pps to 60.8%), the greater wealth concentration is likely to mainly be a consequence of the euro crisis; this is supported by the deterioration mainly in the second decade. Without question, Greece was the country most affected by the crisis, with absolute wealth losses – which obviously mainly hit the middle of society. Malta and Slovenia also underwent similar developments, although in both countries the share of the top 10 is still well below average at 53.8% and 57.2%, respectively. Countries where wealth concentration has increased significantly also include the usual suspects such as Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India and the US: despite strong overall wealth growth, the richest country in the world (in terms of net financial assets) has not been able to improve its very unequal distribution situation; over the last decade it has only been possible to avoid a further deterioration.

This is then also the general conclusion of the analysis of the national distribution situation. There have been improvements only in a few countries, and if so, mainly in those with previously (and still today) very unequal distribution; examples are South Africa and Türkiye. In contrast, distribution has (further) deteriorated in many large emerging countries; examples are Brazil, Mexico, Russia, but also India and China. In most cases, this was driven by outrageous wealth growth at the very top. Even more worrying, however, is the development in the advanced economies. High inequality has been seen as one of the great social challenges for years – but nothing has been done about it. Stagnation – even if it stops a previous downward trend – is not improvement. Cementing a distribution situation that is perceived as unjust is a creeping social poison. And the challenge is not getting any smaller. In the past decade, monetary and fiscal policy could operate almost unconstrained; the next few years promise much more difficult conditions to initiate a turnaround in wealth distribution.

## Appendix A: Methodological comments

### *General assumptions*

The Allianz Global Wealth Report analyses gross financial assets held by households, i.e., cash and bank deposits, receivables from insurance companies and pension institutions, securities (shares, bonds and investment funds) and other receivables, and liabilities incurred by households. It is based on data from 57 countries. This group of countries covers 91% of global GDP and 72% of the global population. In 43 countries, we had access to statistics from the macroeconomic financial accounts. In the other countries, we were able to estimate the volume of total financial assets based on information from household surveys, bank statistics, statistics on assets held in equities and bonds and technical reserves.

In some countries, it is still extremely difficult to find data on the financial assets of private households. Let's take the Latin American countries as an example. For many countries, the only information that can be found relates to the entire private sector or the economy as a whole, which is often of only limited use as far as the situation of private households is concerned. In addition to Chile, Colombia has fairly good data that can be used to analyze the financial structure of private household assets. In Argentina, for example, we were able to estimate financial assets with the help of data on bank deposits and insurance reserves.

In order to rule out exchange rate distortions over time, the financial assets were converted into the national currency based on the fixed exchange rate at the end of 2022. The closing date for data to be included in the report is July 31st.

### *Statistical distinctions*

The process associated with the introduction of the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010) in September 2014 involved updating and harmonizing the guidelines governing the preparation of many macroeconomic statistics. The new requirements also apply to the macroeconomic financial accounts. One change relates to private households: under the ESVG 2010 regulations, the two sectors „Private households“ and „Private organizations without pecuniary reward“ are no longer grouped, but are now reported separately. This also has implications for the Allianz Global Wealth Report, which takes data from the macroeconomic financial accounts as a basis where available. For many countries, however – particularly those outside of the EU – there is no separate data available for these sectors in general, or at least not at present. So in order to ensure global comparability, this publication analyzes both sectors together under the heading „private households“.

### *Determination of wealth bands for global wealth classes*

Lower wealth threshold: There is a close link between financial assets and the incomes of private households. According to Davies et al. (2009)<sup>4</sup>, private individuals with below-average income tend to have no assets at all, or only very few. It is only when individuals move into middle and higher income groups that they start to accumulate any assets to speak of. We have applied this link to our analysis. Countries in the upper-middle income bracket (based on the World Bank's country classification system) therefore form the group in which the average assets of private households has reached a relevant volume for the first time. This value marks the lower threshold for the global middle wealth class. How high should this value be?

In terms of income, households with incomes that correspond to between 75% and 150% of average net income are generally considered to constitute the middle class. According to Davies et al., households with income corresponding to 75% of the average income have assets that correspond to 30% of the average assets. As far as the upper threshold is concerned, 150% of average income corresponds to 180% of average assets. Consequently, we have set the threshold values for the wealth middle class at 30% and 180% of average per capital assets. If we use net financial assets to calculate the two thresholds, we arrive at an asset range of between EUR9,600 and EUR57,400 for the global middle wealth class in 2022.

Individuals with higher per capita financial assets then belong to the global high wealth class, whereas those with lower per capita financial assets belong to the low wealth class.

<sup>4</sup>Davies, James B. et al. (2009), The level and distribution of global household wealth, NBER working paper 15508.

## Appendix B1: Gross financial assets and liabilities by country, 2022

	Gross financial assets				Liabilities			
	in EUR bn	yoy in %	EUR per capita	as % of GDP	in EUR bn	yoy in %	EUR per capita	as % of GDP
Argentina	88	82.6	1,930	20.0	20	61.2	440	4.6
Australia	4,239	-1.3	163,520	272.4	1,837	5.6	70,890	118.1
Austria	805	-2.7	90,170	179.8	222	2.7	24,840	49.5
Belgium	1,477	-5.1	127,230	267.4	342	5.0	29,430	61.9
Brazil	2,623	-9.8	12,240	149.1	861	17.7	4,020	48.9
Bulgaria	123	2.6	17,880	145.6	23	11.1	3,370	27.4
Cambodia	30	13.5	1,780	108.2	13	17.1	770	47.1
Canada	6,502	-2.3	170,400	337.6	2,020	6.3	52,950	104.9
Chile	488	4.1	25,030	168.9	142	14.0	7,300	49.2
China	32,852	6.9	23,040	199.9	10,101	5.4	7,080	61.5
Colombia	262	3.3	5,090	92.8	99	14.4	1,910	34.9
Croatia	80	2.0	19,770	119.1	22	5.5	5,440	32.8
Czech Republic	391	5.7	37,210	139.3	108	4.1	10,250	38.4
Denmark	1,292	-10.0	220,730	344.3	333	-10.1	56,900	88.7
Estonia	44	0.8	33,450	122.8	15	10.8	11,200	41.1
Finland	406	-4.4	73,340	152.2	207	1.1	37,360	77.6
France	6,361	-3.6	98,570	240.8	2,005	5.0	31,070	75.9
Germany	7,454	-4.9	89,360	192.8	2,154	4.4	25,830	55.7
Greece	305	1.9	29,230	146.8	104	-6.3	9,950	50.0
Hungary	215	8.0	22,190	138.6	37	7.2	3,800	23.7
India	3,834	9.4	2,720	124.3	1,146	23.3	810	37.2
Indonesia	448	11.0	1,640	38.0	185	8.8	670	15.7
Ireland	499	-2.6	100,050	99.3	143	0.9	28,690	28.5
Israel	1,072	-0.5	120,420	229.9	250	11.7	28,050	53.5
Italy	5,139	-5.1	86,750	269.2	1,031	2.8	17,410	54.0
Japan	14,946	0.2	119,940	378.1	2,921	2.6	23,440	73.9
Kazakhstan	44	24.1	2,300	21.0	36	31.3	1,870	17.0
Latvia	38	5.7	20,140	94.2	8	5.2	4,140	19.3
Lithuania	67	1.4	23,890	99.5	17	14.8	6,160	25.7
Malaysia	639	1.0	19,020	167.9	309	5.4	9,200	81.2
Malta	36	2.9	68,210	213.0	10	9.3	18,710	58.4
Mexico	1,507	2.2	11,890	110.1	71	16.9	560	5.2
Netherlands	2,746	-11.8	156,920	291.3	942	3.5	53,800	99.9
New Zealand	773	-5.1	150,740	343.0	169	4.7	32,980	75.0
Norway	618	1.3	114,360	116.6	434	3.7	80,300	81.9
Pakistan	147	8.4	630	53.0	12	26.8	50	4.3
Peru	100	-5.0	2,960	42.8	39	16.9	1,160	16.8
Philippines	297	12.9	2,610	80.3	98	10.3	860	26.5
Poland	608	1.8	15,870	92.8	179	-3.8	4,660	27.3
Portugal	487	1.9	47,340	203.4	184	4.4	17,890	76.9
Romania	207	5.7	10,700	72.4	53	3.6	2,770	18.7
Russia	1,652	9.4	11,380	85.0	416	9.3	2,870	21.4
Serbia	23	2.9	3,090	37.3	12	6.1	1,700	20.6
Singapore	1,151	3.2	193,660	255.9	252	0.8	42,460	56.1
Slovakia	103	-3.0	18,930	95.7	54	7.5	9,920	50.2
Slovenia	74	3.7	34,700	124.7	17	6.3	7,850	28.2
South Africa	683	1.7	11,500	186.9	149	7.3	2,510	40.7
South Korea	3,694	1.2	71,270	231.8	1,724	3.6	33,270	108.2
Spain	2,720	-0.3	57,270	204.6	760	-0.6	16,000	57.2
Sri Lanka	36	4.4	1,660	60.0	7	9.2	320	11.6
Sweden	1,704	-9.0	162,820	319.8	489	3.8	46,750	91.8
Switzerland	3,097	-2.1	356,310	396.7	1,022	2.9	117,530	130.9
Taiwan	4,017	3.6	168,350	580.3	638	6.3	26,750	92.2
Thailand	774	2.1	10,820	164.8	409	3.7	5,710	87.0
Türkiye	365	70.2	4,310	48.7	93	58.2	1,090	12.3
United Kingdom	8,471	-5.0	125,900	302.8	2,525	6.4	37,520	90.2
United States	103,774	-6.4	307,940	434.9	18,361	6.0	54,480	77.0

## Appendix B2: Net financial assets by country, 2022

	Net financial assets			Gini coefficient of wealth distribution	GDP
	in EUR bn	yoy in %	EUR per capita	in %	EUR per capita
Argentina	67	90.1	1,490	0.71	9,610
Australia	2,401	-6.1	92,630	0.70	59,440
Austria	583	-4.6	65,330	0.74	50,070
Belgium	1,136	-7.7	97,790	0.65	47,400
Brazil	1,763	-19.1	8,220	0.85	8,170
Bulgaria	100	0.8	14,510	0.71	12,470
Cambodia	17	11.0	1,000	0.71	1,630
Canada	4,481	-5.7	117,450	0.71	50,090
Chile	346	0.6	17,730	0.85	14,730
China	22,751	7.6	15,960	0.72	11,530
Colombia	164	-2.4	3,180	0.74	5,450
Croatia	58	0.7	14,320	0.69	16,720
Czech Republic	283	6.3	26,960	0.71	26,760
Denmark	959	-9.9	163,830	0.68	63,810
Estonia	30	-3.5	22,250	0.78	27,280
Finland	199	-9.6	35,970	0.73	48,130
France	4,356	-7.1	67,500	0.70	40,880
Germany	5,300	-8.3	63,540	0.72	46,380
Greece	201	6.7	19,280	0.82	20,030
Hungary	179	8.2	18,390	0.75	15,600
India	2,688	4.4	1,910	0.71	2,180
Indonesia	263	12.7	960	0.72	4,280
Ireland	356	-3.9	71,360	0.84	100,050
Israel	822	-3.6	92,370	0.73	51,590
Italy	4,108	-6.9	69,340	0.72	32,340
Japan	12,025	-0.3	96,500	0.71	31,890
Kazakhstan	8	0.5	440	0.72	10,840
Latvia	30	5.9	16,000	0.70	21,650
Lithuania	49	-2.5	17,720	0.70	24,330
Malaysia	330	-2.8	9,830	0.72	11,210
Malta	26	0.6	49,500	0.63	31,630
Mexico	1,436	1.6	11,330	0.84	10,730
Netherlands	1,805	-18.1	103,110	0.62	53,680
New Zealand	604	-7.6	117,760	0.70	43,480
Norway	184	-3.9	34,060	0.70	97,480
Pakistan	135	7.0	580	0.71	1,180
Peru	61	-15.2	1,800	0.83	6,860
Philippines	199	14.2	1,750	0.73	3,200
Poland	429	4.3	11,200	0.81	16,440
Portugal	303	0.4	29,450	0.73	23,320
Romania	153	6.5	7,930	0.70	14,520
Russia	1,236	9.4	8,520	0.78	13,430
Serbia	10	-0.8	1,380	0.70	8,370
Singapore	898	3.9	151,200	0.73	75,240
Slovakia	49	-12.5	9,010	0.66	19,090
Slovenia	57	2.9	26,850	0.70	27,830
South Africa	534	0.3	9,000	0.87	6,100
South Korea	1,969	-0.8	38,000	0.71	30,750
Spain	1,960	-0.1	41,260	0.68	27,940
Sri Lanka	29	3.3	1,340	0.74	2,770
Sweden	1,215	-13.2	116,060	0.71	50,520
Switzerland	2,075	-4.4	238,780	0.73	89,320
Taiwan	3,379	3.1	141,600	0.70	28,970
Thailand	366	0.5	5,110	0.80	6,550
Türkiye	273	74.7	3,220	0.76	8,800
United Kingdom	5,946	-9.2	88,380	0.70	41,440
United States	85,413	-8.7	253,450	0.77	70,530



## Appendix C: Global ranking 2022

... by net financial assets per capita, in EUR			... by gross financial assets per capita, in EUR		
1	United States	253,450	1	Switzerland	356,310
2	Switzerland	238,780	2	United States	307,940
3	Denmark	163,830	3	Denmark	220,730
4	Singapore	151,200	4	Singapore	193,660
5	Taiwan	141,600	5	Canada	170,400
6	New Zealand	117,760	6	Taiwan	168,350
7	Canada	117,450	7	Australia	163,520
8	Sweden	116,060	8	Sweden	162,820
9	Netherlands	103,110	9	Netherlands	156,920
10	Belgium	97,790	10	New Zealand	150,740
11	Japan	96,500	11	Belgium	127,230
12	Australia	92,630	12	United Kingdom	125,900
13	Israel	92,370	13	Israel	120,420
14	United Kingdom	88,380	14	Japan	119,940
15	Ireland	71,360	15	Norway	114,360
16	Italy	69,340	16	Ireland	100,050
17	France	67,500	17	France	98,570
18	Austria	65,330	18	Austria	90,170
19	Germany	63,540	19	Germany	89,360
20	Malta	49,500	20	Italy	86,750
21	Spain	41,260	21	Finland	73,340
22	South Korea	38,000	22	South Korea	71,270
23	Finland	35,970	23	Malta	68,210
24	Norway	34,060	24	Spain	57,270
25	Portugal	29,450	25	Portugal	47,340
26	Czech Republic	26,960	26	Czech Republic	37,210
27	Slovenia	26,850	27	Slovenia	34,700
28	Estonia	22,250	28	Estonia	33,450
29	Greece	19,280	29	Greece	29,230
30	Hungary	18,390	30	Chile	25,030
31	Chile	17,730	31	Lithuania	23,890
32	Lithuania	17,720	32	China	23,040
33	Latvia	16,000	33	Hungary	22,190
34	China	15,960	34	Latvia	20,140
35	Bulgaria	14,510	35	Croatia	19,770
36	Croatia	14,320	36	Malaysia	19,020
37	Mexico	11,330	37	Slovakia	18,930
38	Poland	11,200	38	Bulgaria	17,880
39	Malaysia	9,830	39	Poland	15,870
40	Slovakia	9,010	40	Brazil	12,240
41	South Africa	9,000	41	Mexico	11,890
42	Russia	8,520	42	South Africa	11,500
43	Brazil	8,220	43	Russia	11,380
44	Romania	7,930	44	Thailand	10,820
45	Thailand	5,110	45	Romania	10,700
46	Türkiye	3,220	46	Colombia	5,090
47	Colombia	3,180	47	Türkiye	4,310
48	India	1,910	48	Serbia	3,090
49	Peru	1,800	49	Peru	2,960
50	Philippines	1,750	50	India	2,720
51	Argentina	1,490	51	Philippines	2,610
52	Serbia	1,380	52	Kazakhstan	2,300
53	Sri Lanka	1,340	53	Argentina	1,930
54	Cambodia	1,000	54	Cambodia	1,780
55	Indonesia	960	55	Sri Lanka	1,660
56	Pakistan	580	56	Indonesia	1,640
57	Kazakhstan	440	57	Pakistan	630



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